The revocation hearing and the criminal action are parallel actions. The civil action is pursued independently of the criminal action, the two actions are tried at different times before different factfinders, and the actions are resolved by separate judgements. The administrative license revocation and criminal prosecution are pursued separately and concluded at different times. The second factor under multiple punishment analysis is whether the conduct precipitating the revocation hearing and the criminal prosecution consists of one offense or two offenses.
We apply the test established in Blockburger v. United States, U. See Swafford, N. In Blockburger, the Supreme Court stated that: [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact the other does not. Blockburger, U.
FRANKLIN v. STATE
Dixon, U. The Blockburger test focuses the inquiry on whether each statute requires proof of an element that is not contained in the other. If each statute requires proof of an element not contained in the other, then the offenses are two separate crimes and double jeopardy does not bar multiple punishment. In one of the cases dismissed by Respondent, the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test; in the other case, the defendant failed the chemical test.
We analyze these situations independently to determine whether each statute requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not.
Section D 3. A violation of Section D 3 is predicated on a failure to submit to a chemical test as required under the Implied Consent Act, with the additional requirement that the court must find that the person refusing the chemical test was in fact driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
We conclude that Section F and Section D 3 constitute the same offense under the Blockburger same-elements test. In the Baca case, the defendant failed the chemical test.
The elements of these two offenses are identical; the criminal charge does not require proof of facts which the civil revocation action would not have required to be proven. Our determinations that the license revocation hearing and criminal prosecution for DWI are separate proceedings, and that license revocation under the Implied Consent Act and criminal prosecution for DWI are the same offense, do not end our analysis.
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars multiple punishments for the same offense in separate proceedings. Jones, U. Helvering v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, U. Ward, U. In United States v. The manager was convicted on sixty-five counts of violating the federal criminal false claims statute, 18 U. The government subsequently sued the manager under a similar civil false claims statute, 31 U. The Court explained: This constitutional protection is intrinsically personal. Its violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state.
It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment. These goals are familiar.
We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence. We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. Kusserow, F. For example, in Department of Revenue v.
If the penalty may be fairly characterized only as a deterrent or as retribution, then the revocation is punishment; if the penalty may be fairly characterized as remedial, then it is not punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. We now examine the procedure and penalties under the Implied Consent Act to determine the purposes those penalties might fairly be said to serve.
Memphis Dui Lawyer
Under the Act, when a person is arrested for DWI, the arresting officer may request that the person submit to a chemical test for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of his or her blood. Section If the driver refuses to permit chemical testing, or is over twenty-one years old and submits to a chemical test and has a result that indicates a blood-alcohol concentration of.
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- CLAPS v. STATE?
If the person requests a hearing, the temporary license remains valid until the date the MVD issues the order following that hearing. Section B - C. See Section Section G. Drivers who lose their license for the first time under the Implied Consent Act for the first time may apply for a limited license thirty days after the date of revocation if they provide the MVD with proof of insurance, proof of employment or enrollment in school, and proof of enrollment in an approved DWI course and an approved alcohol screening program.
See Section C 1. See Section B. In order to ascertain whether these sanctions are punitive we must look at the purposes that the sanctions actually serve.
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See Doe v. Poritz, N. We believe it significant that the operation of automobiles on public highways is an activity that is regulated by the government. The government regulates many activities, including driving, participation in government programs such as Medicare, and participation in certain professions such as the practice of law or medicine.
A critical element of this government regulation is the requirement that participants obtain licenses to pursue the regulated activity or occupation. As one court has stated: The rationale for this system of regulation is that the public is exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm if the activity or occupation is performed incompetently, recklessly, dishonestly, or with intent to injure. Under these regulatory schemes, a person must obtain a license to pursue the regulated activity or occupation, and the government possesses the power to revoke the license of someone whose conduct demonstrates his or her unfitness to continue in that activity or occupation.
When an individual fails to adhere to the standards set by the government for participation in a regulated activity or occupation, the government generally may bar the individual from participation in that activity or occupation without implicating double jeopardy, so long as the sanction reasonably serves regulatory goals adopted in the public interest. The county court has now certified two questions to this court as being of great public importance:. Does the suspension of a DUI arrestee's driver's license because of the results of a breath test being in excess of 0.
Does either the statutory provision allowing for a DUI arrestee to be held for eight hours after arrest or the policy of the Volusia County Branch Jail requiring that all arrestees be held for 8 hours constitute punishment barring subsequent prosecution of the arrestee for the DUI charge? The first certified question deals with those defendants who take, and fail, the breath test.
We agree with Freeman v. State, So. Florida, U. Their licenses were seized by the arresting officer pursuant to section These defendants argued that the suspensions of their licenses for the same conduct alleged in the criminal charges for DUI violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. This argument contends that such roadside license suspensions are punitive in nature, hence jeopardy attached before the state prosecuted them for driving under the influence. This argument was rejected by the Second District, which wrote:.
In Florida, it is clear that the purpose of the statute providing for revocation of a driver's license upon conviction of a licensee for driving while intoxicated is to provide an administrative remedy for public protection and not for punishment of the offender. Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.
We note that the holding in Freeman comports with legislative intent as expressed in section We also answer the second question contrary to the determination by the county court. Kelso v. Pearce, U. Its emphasis is thus on adjudications of guilt and sentences, not on jury verdicts. While the latter may be a condition precedent to an adjudication of guilt and sentence, by itself a verdict imposes no punishment.
State v. Nichols, Ariz. | Casetext
Claps argues, however, that counsel was ineffective for not moving to prevent the jury from hearing all of the charges which the State felt it could prove, when both the State and the court knew he could not lawfully be adjudicated and sentenced for some of the charges if found guilty on others. Generally, when asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, U. In Claps' case, the postconviction court concluded that while the rule against conviction for multiple counts arising from a single act is clear, no law prevents charging a defendant with multiple counts.